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Byrd  1 
A Reflection on Moral Maxims 
In Reflections; or Sentences and Moral Maxims, François Duc de La 
Rochefoucauld argues that virtues often exists as vices in disguise. He supports this idea 
in his maxims, arguing that “the motives that underlie conventionally virtuous behavior 
are often character traits conventionally thought vicious,” that “much concern with 
virtue in others is a dressed-up expression of self-love,” and that “vice has a complex 
role in happiness” (Dunkle, lecture). In this paper, I will argue there is some credence to 
La Rochefoucauld’s first two assertions, but they appear extreme and do not apply to all 
cases. Instead, I propose that a duality exists in vice and virtue and that both play an 
intricate role in friendship and happiness.  
Argument 1 
(1)  “Passions often produce their contraries” (La Rochefoucauld §11). 
(2)  The repulsion to lying is often a concealed desire to make our words appear 
accurate and meaningful, which attaches a virtuous light to our character 
and conversation (§163). 
(3)  “Idleness and fear keep us in the path of duty, but our virtue often gets the 
praise” (§169). 
(4)  No one should receive praise for acting in a virtuous manner unless they 
recognize the vicious disposition within them (§237). 
 (5) Therefore, the motives that typically characterize moral behavior are often 
those which constitute vicious behavior. 
What constitutes vices, virtues, and passions? La Rochefoucauld describes what 
may be involved with these but never gives a clear definition of them. More 
importantly, what is the relationship between vice and virtue and can they interact?  
Aristotle, book 6 of The Nicomachean Ethics, claims that for an action to be 
virtuous, it must be aimed at being true and have the right intention. One problem with 
basing the goodness of actions on intentions is that their content cannot explicitly be 
proven. Therefore, an argument asserting that the content is good (hence, virtuous) can 
only be assessing the behavior and not underlying intentions. The only way we would be 
able to dispel this idea is through empirical evidence. What then is La Rochefoucauld 
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suggesting when he claims that virtues are often concealed vices, and how are they 
associated? One answer is that behavior that appears virtuous may stem from 
intentions that are ultimately vicious.  
Not only can vicious intentions be the cause of virtuous actions, but the 
interaction of the two can also influence our behavior. He explores this idea by claiming 
that “vices enter into the composition of virtues as poison into that of medicines. 
Prudence collects and blends the two and renders them useful against the ills of life” 
(§182). By this he means that appropriate human behavior is a product of the complex 
interaction between vices and virtues and that acting through prudence is accomplished 
through understanding this interaction and behaving according to social norms. It 
appears that La Rochefoucauld is suggesting that vices have value, in this case, not only 
in distinguishing right from wrong but, as we will also explore, in what makes us happy 
and in friendship. 
Aristotle would disagree, arguing that prudence exercises our rationality, 
requiring the correct desires and the right actions for attaining those desires. He also 
claims that prudence is an absolute phenomenon, meaning one possesses it entirely or 
not at all. La Rochefoucauld would agree that prudence exercises our rationality in 
action, as it renders the integration of vices and virtues “useful against the ills of life,” 
but he would disagree that prudence requires true desires and the right actions for 
attaining those desires. Instead, La Rochefoucauld would argue the opposite, that no 
desires have purely good intentions (i.e. they are all motivated by self-interest) and are 
determined to be socially acceptable before the onset of action. Again, the thoughts and 
intentions are different from the way they appear in behavior. If prudence is a blend of 
vice and virtue, then this inherently goes against Aristotle's claim that prudence is 
absolute, and, if La Rochefoucauld's characterization of virtue is correct, then Aristotle's 
view of prudence and thereby virtuous behavior is unsound. 
Admittedly though, some intentions must be honorable and selfless, like the 
intentions of parents for their children. However, one could argue that this behavior is 
due to the evolutionary advantage of passing on the parents' genes and that all the joy 
and seemingly unconditional love is primarily a product of oxytocin and other pleasure 
neurotransmitters like dopamine and serotonin that flood the brain when interacting 
with one's child (thereby loving behavior also supports evolutionary advantage). 
Though, this does not mean we love and adore our children any less; our reasoning for 
having children is not (consciously at least) solely to pass on our genes. Therefore, I 
agree with La Rochefoucauld that virtuous behavior stems from selfish intentions and, 
consequently, I suggest that actions and intentions possess a dual nature.  
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Take friendship for instance. Aristotle claimed that it was a virtue (as a state of a 
character) being “most necessary with a view to living” (Aristotle, book 8). Everyone 
needs friends, whether wealthy, destitute, young, or old. It is both instrumentally 
valuable (as a means to become virtuous) and intrinsically valuable (e.g. the person of 
commendable character is one with friends). However, when La Rochefoucauld's 
characterization of virtues is applied, it sculpts a very different view of what friendship 
can be. For example, friendship can be harmful in the sense that loving and doing things 
for a friend(s) takes away from other obligations we have, such as to family, school, or 
work. Groups of friends can also bring out lousy character traits in us depending on the 
group of people we surround ourselves with, for example, if the friend(s) use alcohol or 
drugs. Also, our friends are bound to dislike certain aspects of our character; therefore, 
we may ultimately mute components of our personality or cease engaging in an activity 
to appear more desirable to our friends or promote homogeneity within our group. 
Additionally, to maintain a friendship, it may be beneficial not to act virtuously 
all the time . If we can indeed be ourselves among our friends, then we should be able 
to display a degree of our negative character traits while maintaining the special love 
within a perfect friendship. Thus, we see that vice plays an essential role in something as 
seemingly pure and virtuous as friendship.  
I would also like to point out another case that illustrates the duality of 
friendship. La Rochefoucauld claimed that “if we judge love by the majority of its results, 
it rather resembles hatred than friendship” (§72), meaning that there exist a plethora of 
other feelings that relationships engender in addition to love. These can include (but are 
not limited to) jealousy (either of our friends or any deviation of their attention away 
from us), dependency (emotionally), and the inevitable disinterestedness (in which 
heartbreak begets hate). Love is complicated, and we feel attachment or a special bond 
to our friends. When the other person betrays us or severs this bond, it is not only 
emotionally, but physically painful. It is only natural to feel strong emotions against 
those who harmed us in this way. Perfect friendship is not immune to this pain, which is 
often intensified because the attachment is so robust.  
Therefore, friendship involves interacting degrees vice and virtue. 
 
Argument 2 
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(1)  Our virtues attract persecution and hatred, more so than our vices (La 
Rochefoucauld §29). 
(2)  Pride is more important than humility when others commit faults. We offer 
our critiques less so to correct others, but to persuade ourselves that we do 
not possess faults (§37). 
(3)  Friendship is merely a relationship with a “collection of reciprocal interests 
and an exchange of favors” where self-love always expects to benefit from 
trade (§83). 
(4)  We are joyous when our friends are happy not because of our virtue or the 
friendship we share, but instead due to our “self-love,” which makes us feel 
like we too will soon reap good fortune, or that we will somehow benefit 
from our friend's good fortune (§14). 
(5) Therefore, much concern with virtue in others is just a dressed-up expression 
of self-love. 
A degree of self-love is vital in any friendship; without one person contributing 
their importance, the relationship is unequal. Hence this relationship would not 
characterize a perfect friendship if a friendship exists at all. Nevertheless, does La 
Rochefoucauld go too far in saying that concern for our friends’ actions and character 
traits is largely a product of self-love?  
Aristotle would disagree with the first point in La Rochefoucauld's argument and 
respond that one with admirable character traits is an ideal friend, which would attract 
people to such a person rather than repulse them. Moreover, if virtues attract such 
hatred, then how could a virtuous person have so many friends?  
La Rochefoucauld would counter with the idea that “passions produce their 
adversaries,” meaning that intrinsic hate for someone would produce the appearance of 
love behaviorally (§11). Also, there are likely distinct benefits to befriending a virtuous 
person, in particular, if they possess many friends, this will benefit the seeker of 
friendship with connections, hence maximizing their self-love. This phenomenon is 
especially apparent if the seeker of friendship poses as having upstanding character 
traits that they do not possess in reality. Nehamas discusses this idea of the relationship 
between virtue and the forging of friendship further in the first chapter of his work, On 
Friendship, by modifying Aristotle's argument. He suggests that instead of virtue that 
molds a friendship, it is the perception of virtue in the other person that molds a 
friendship (Nehamas: 27-8).  
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Aristotle would disagree with La Rochefoucauld's third and fourth points by 
arguing that they characterize a pleasure or utility friendship and not a perfect 
friendship; they stem from the selfish value of friendship, where the relationship exists 
only for one or both parties to benefit, which maximizes their self-love respectively. 
However, in a perfect friendship, we are joyous when our friends are happy because we 
love them, which involves desiring and acting to bring about goods for our friends, and 
not for the sole purpose of maximizing our self-love. The noble basis of love within a 
friendship, which states that “xLy because of y’s character traits C1 … Cn where C1 … Cn 
include virtues and wisdom” should, therefore, be distinguished (Dunkle, lecture).  
Though La Rochefoucauld argues that friendship is inherently selfish, he may 
concede Aristotle’s point, but with an exception: because we can only love things or 
people that are agreeable to us, and we experience pleasure when we prefer our friends 
to ourselves, our friendships can constitute perfect friendships only when we prefer our 
friends to ourselves (thus, putting the value of our friendship over our self-love) 
friendships can constitute perfect friendships (La Rochefoucauld §81). Furthermore, he 
would add that “however rare true love is, true friendship is rarer” because the majority 
of our relationships are based on self-love (§473).  
Moral philosophy suggests that morality is the “most important set of values in 
life, and to have a moral character requires us to regard everyone as equally deserving 
of moral consideration” (Dunkle, lecture on Nehamas). However, friendship requires 
that we treat our friends with higher regard than others with whom we are less 
intimate, which violates this notion of morality; therefore, friendship cannot be a moral 
virtue. One would imagine that morality is involved with possessing a noble character, 
but if friendship is selfish and also constitutes a good character, then the two oppose 
each other; so, perhaps La Rochefoucauld's assertion that character traits traditionally 
thought to be upright stem from vice is not as extreme as it sounds. However, Aristotle 
does not claim that all virtues are moral; in this case, friendship would fall under the 
category of nonmoral virtues. Intimate (essentially, perfect) friendships exist between 
those who are not virtuous, but alike in their degree of virtue. Furthermore, synthesizing 
both Aristotle's and La Rochefoucauld's ideas on friendship, Nehamas suggests that 
“friendship need not be a beneficial relationship or moral good” (Nehamas: 95). He 
relies on the example of a Flaubert novel where the two friends were not virtuous but 
reveled in the banalities of their existence together (Nehamas: 97). 
Hence, though pleasure or utility friendships apply to La Rochefoucauld's 
argument, perfect friendship is unique because it is not as heavily based on self-love and 
should be distinguished from other types. Moreover, perfect friendship is perhaps more 
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based on the simple comfort of merely existing in each others' presence without lavish 
expectation. 
In conclusion, I have argued that vice and virtue can have a dual nature and play 
an intricate role in friendship and happiness, and hence, La Rochefoucauld's argument 
that vices are often virtues in disguise is often true but does not apply in all cases. 
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